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Summary
In this paper, the authors detail the structure and optimal management of health 
systems as influenced by the presence and level of fixed costs. Unlike variable costs, 
fixed costs cannot be altered, and are thus independent of the level of veterinary 
activity in the short run. Their importance is illustrated by using both single-period and 
multi-period models. It is shown that multi-stage veterinary decision-making can often 
be envisaged as a sequence of fixed-cost problems. In general, it becomes clear that, 
the higher the fixed costs, the greater the net benefit of veterinary activity must be, if 
such activity is to be economic. The authors also assess the extent to which it pays to 
reduce fixed costs and to try to compensate for this by increasing variable costs. 
Fixed costs have major implications for the industrial structure of the animal health 
products industry and for the structure of the private veterinary services industry. In the 
former, they favour market concentration and specialisation in the supply of products. 
In the latter, they foster increased specialisation. While cooperation by individual 
farmers may help to reduce their individual fixed costs, the organisational difficulties 
and costs involved in achieving this cooperation can be formidable. In such cases, the 
only solution is government provision of veterinary services. Moreover, international 
cooperation may be called for. Fixed costs also influence the nature of the provision of 
veterinary education. 
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Introduction
Fixed costs play an important role in shaping the structure 
of animal health systems and in determining the economics 
of procedures for maintaining and improving animal health. 
This article shows why and in what ways they are important. 
Fixed costs significantly influence all major components of 
animal health systems, including economic decisions about 
disease management at the following levels:
– prevention
– surveillance
– diagnosis
– treatment, control and monitoring of diseases.
They are also major economic considerations in:
– veterinary training (human capital formation)
– the supply and composition of veterinary-related 
research and development
– the manufacture of veterinary products
– the provision of veterinary services.
The institutional nature of animal health systems varies. 
However, they usually include both private and public 
components. Public components consist of national policies 
for the maintenance of animal health and international 
arrangements. Fixed costs affect the nature and structure 
of these systems.
Although fixed costs significantly influence the economics 
of the development and operation of animal health systems, 
the concept of fixed costs is by no means straightforward. 
Therefore, this article begins by considering the nature of 
this concept. Simple models are introduced to demonstrate 
the relevance of fixed costs to managerial decisions 
about animal health. The authors subsequently examine 
the influence of fixed costs on the development of the 
institutional structures of animal health systems, and on 
institutional strategies designed to cope with such costs. 
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The nature of fixed costs
The concept of fixed costs was first introduced into the 
economic literature by Alfred Marshall (1), to help explain 
the economic behaviour of firms and the operation of market 
systems. He described fixed costs as costs that cannot be 
avoided if the firm wants to operate. Unlike variable costs, 
they do not vary with the level of the firm’s production in 
the short run. However, his theory does allow for fixed costs 
to be varied in the long run. Marshall’s concept of fixed 
and variable costs corresponds roughly to the concepts of 
overhead costs and operational costs used in the literature 
of accounting and business management.
Although Marshall’s concept of fixed costs is useful for 
understanding the way in which market systems work, it 
has limitations in enabling animal health managers to make 
satisfactory or optimal economic decisions about animal 
health projects. This is because it does not explicitly allow 
for the passage of time (his modelling relies on comparative 
statics), and not enough attention is given to the varied 
components of fixed costs, the time at which these costs 
are incurred, and the extent to which these costs can be 
recovered when a project is discontinued, or when the 
items involved are transferred for use in another project. 
Costs which have the attributes of fixed costs are pre-
project costs, initial overhead costs and recurrent overhead 
costs. Pre-project costs include planning costs. Initial 
overhead costs consist of outlays on plant and equipment 
when a project commences and recurrent overhead costs 
are periodic outlays (such as the replacement of plant and 
equipment) necessary for the continuation of a project. 
Fixed costs can also include contractual costs for a period of 
time; for example, labour contracts and rental agreements. 
For some projects, there is room for some flexibility in the 
composition of fixed costs. For example, scope can exist for 
either buying or renting equipment, contracting out parts of 
a project, and so on. Moreover, as discussed later, there may 
also be the option of reducing fixed costs if extra variable 
costs are incurred. 
Even though the concepts of fixed costs and overhead costs 
are not straightforward, simple models can illustrate their 
importance for animal health systems. Note that these two 
concepts of fixed and overhead costs are similar but not 
identical. Estimates of overhead costs are heavily influenced 
by accounting conventions. In the following examples, 
most attention is given to fixed costs as a part of single-
period modelling, although multi-period modelling is also 
covered.
Single-period modelling
Single-period economic modelling is more informative than 
it may appear at first sight. This is because many multi-
period problems can be reduced to single-period ones 
by estimating the present discounted value of alternative 
multi-period plans (2), or – as shown in game theory – by 
replacing the extensive form of a game with its reduced form 
(3). Furthermore, the length of time which constitutes a 
single period is flexible. Increased generality in the analysis 
can be achieved by analysing this problem as an economic 
cost–benefit problem. Depending on the particular case, 
costs and benefits of projects can be described in private 
or social terms.
The simple linear model shown in Figure 1 illustrates the 
basic concepts associated with fixed costs when making 
decisions about veterinary interventions. The line ABC 
represents fixed costs and the line ADE represents total 
cost in relation to the scale or intensity, x1, of a particular 
veterinary activity. The difference between lines ADE and 
ABC measures total variable costs. The line ODF indicates 
the total economic benefit from this activity. If the activity 
is to provide a net economic benefit, the scale that it is 
engaged in must not be less than x1. Other things being 
constant, the higher the fixed costs, the greater the required 
scale of veterinary activity before this activity becomes 
economic. In Figure 1, x1 is the economic threshold 
constituting a watershed for decision-making: below x1 the 
costs associated with veterinary intervention exceed the 
benefits, whereas above x1, the opposite is the case. 
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Fig. 1 
A simple model to illustrate how the scale of veterinary 
intervention is important to achieve a net benefit from veterinary 
activity when fixed costs are significant
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Figure 1 can be used to discuss the rationale for disease 
management, on either an individual or national scale, 
when fixed costs are taken into account. For example, it 
can be deduced that, if x represents the size of the herd 
requiring veterinary interventions, those with small herds 
(i.e. <x1) would find preventative intervention uneconomic, 
whereas those with a larger herd (i.e. ≥x1) would be 
economically justified in investing in preventative care. Or, 
given another interpretation, if only a small proportion of a 
herd is affected by a disease, it is likely to be uneconomic to 
treat those animals if the fixed costs of doing so are high and 
the disease is not contagious. Alternatively, if the decision-
maker is able to reduce their fixed costs without increasing 
other costs significantly, it is likely to be more economic to 
maintain or improve animal health for a greater number of 
animals. 
Neither the total cost curve nor the total benefit curve 
shown in Figure 1 needs to be represented by a linear 
function. In the case shown in Figure 1, preventative care 
is economic for the whole herd (x2) if the herd exceeds x1 
in size. In non-linear cases, this will also hold true if the 
total net benefit rises with the size of the herd. However, in 
some non-linear cases, the net benefit function may reach a 
maximum before the whole herd obtains preventative care. 
If the economic value of the herd is very high, then the 
economic benefit curve may lie above the total cost curve. 
In this case, there is no minimum economic threshold for 
treatment and veterinary intervention would be justified 
even if only required for one animal. For further discussion 
and application of these types of models, see Tisdell (4).
The cost–benefit relationships shown in Figure 1 are 
continuous, even though, for many species, it would be 
more realistic to portray these as functions of integers. 
However, continuous representation does not affect the 
essentials of the analysis. 
Multi-period modelling
In multi-period contexts, the Marshallian concept of fixed 
costs is not as analytically useful as it is in single-period 
contexts. In the multi-period management of animal health, 
it is often necessary to incur recurrent overhead costs, such 
as replacing equipment due to depreciation or obsolescence, 
and the skills of veterinary staff may need to be upgraded 
by investing in human capital. However, there is usually 
some discretion about the timing of these expenditures 
and whether or not to undertake them. Nevertheless, 
deciding to delay expenditure on ‘recurrent’ overheads 
can result in increased operational costs or reduced benefit 
from veterinary activity. For example, failing to replace 
veterinary equipment in a timely manner is likely to add 
to operational costs (for example, maintenance costs and 
down-time costs) and reduce benefits, for instance, as a 
result of reduced accuracy and increased time required for 
the diagnosis of a disease. Failure to maintain or upgrade 
veterinary qualifications can also contribute to economic 
inefficiency.
An important economic consideration in multi-period 
management of animal health is the magnitude of overhead 
costs and the time-pattern in which they must be incurred. 
If high upfront costs are involved and large ‘lumpy’ 
expenditures are required at some stages of the health 
programme, some providers may be unable to finance these 
outlays, even if the health programme would be economic 
from their perspective.
Multi-stage veterinary decision-
making as a sequence of fixed-
cost problems
Veterinary diagnosis (and sometimes treatment) frequently 
occurs in several discrete steps or stages, and the cost to 
the customer of proceeding to each stage is often a fixed, 
specified amount. Therefore, each stage involves a fixed 
cost to the customer. Usually, the continuation of this 
multi-stage process depends on the results obtained in 
earlier stages. How far a customer decides to proceed with 
this process (for instance, in attending to the health of a 
particular animal) will be influenced by the extra benefits 
in comparison to the extra costs envisaged by the customer. 
However, especially in the beginning, the costs and benefits 
of this process are likely to be uncertain, but they normally 
become clearer as the stages advance.
Optimality would require stopping the multi-stage process 
once it becomes apparent that the extra benefit from 
engaging in further stages can be expected to be less than 
the additional cost. However, it is not easy for the customer 
to determine when to stop because his/her knowledge is 
much less than that of the veterinarian, even if the latter may 
also have imperfect knowledge. Consequently, asymmetry 
of knowledge occurs (5). This asymmetry can result in over-
servicing by the veterinarian if he/she takes advantage of the 
customer’s relative ignorance.
On the other hand, the main motive for ‘over-servicing’ 
by the veterinarian may not be to increase his/her profit 
from dealing with the customer, but to safeguard his/her 
reputation – that is, to reduce the likelihood of incorrect 
diagnosis or treatment. This may also accord with the 
customer’s objective, if the customer is very risk averse.
The cost to the customer of over-servicing depends on the 
attributes of the net benefit obtained as a function of the 
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discrete stages involved in diagnosis and treatment. If this 
function is very peaked, then considerable benefits will be 
lost by the customer as a result of over-servicing. If it is 
relatively flat for those stages after this function reaches a 
maximum, this loss will be quite small (see 6).
The role of multi-stage fixed costs extends well beyond 
the rationale for the provision of veterinary services. For 
example, some research projects are funded in multiple 
stages, with the donor contributing a fixed sum at each 
stage. Each stage involves a fixed cost from the donor’s point 
of view, even though the amount of funds to be provided 
at each stage may vary. This concept extends into dealing 
with fixed-price contracts or multi-stage contracts as, at 
each stage, the principal incurs a fixed cost. In all the cases 
mentioned above, the fixed costs associated with each stage 
are a significant influence on the net benefits of taking part 
in the decision-making process and continuing funding the 
activity. Relevant models can be formalised but there is not 
room to do that here. 
Trade-off between fixed costs 
and variable costs in animal 
health systems
Alternative methods combining different mixtures of fixed 
and variable costs are often available for maintaining or 
improving animal health. There is frequently an inverse 
relationship between the level of fixed costs and the level 
of variable costs incurred when operating an animal health 
system. Consequently, the average total costs (per unit of 
activity) of veterinary systems with high fixed costs are 
usually higher than those with lower fixed costs for low 
levels of veterinary activity. This relationship is normally 
reversed at high levels of activity. This is illustrated in 
Figure 2. The curve ABC represents average costs when a 
technique with high fixed costs (Technique I) is adopted 
and curve DBE shows this when a technique with lower 
fixed costs (Technique II) is chosen. Technique II minimises 
the total cost if x < x1 but Technique I minimises the total 
cost if x > x1.
To avoid cluttering, the average fixed-cost curves and 
variable-cost curves are not shown separately in Figure 2. 
However, the average fixed-cost curves form rectangular 
hyperbolas. In Figure 2, the fixed-cost curve is assumed to 
be lower for Technique II than Technique I. The average 
variable-cost curve can take a variety of mathematical 
forms. It can, for example, be constant, decreasing, rising, 
or – after falling at first – could begin to rise. Its nature 
depends on the particular case. In some cases, the average 
total-cost curve can be U-shaped. Each cost curve ought to 
be based on a cost-efficient expansion path for sustaining or 
improving animal health. A detailed application of this type 
of approach to human health can be found in Tisdell (7). 
Rushton (8) applies this type of analysis to the economics 
of livestock production.
According to standard microeconomic analysis, maximising 
net economic benefit requires the total cost corresponding 
to any level of gross economic benefit to be minimised, i.e. 
the ‘golden rule’ of cost minimisation (9). However, this 
rule is based on a series of assumptions that are not always 
satisfied; for example, perfect capital markets and perfect 
knowledge. Capital markets, especially in developing 
countries, are far from perfect. Farmers may fail to get 
funding to cover significant fixed costs, even when the 
associated technique is the least expensive one. Moreover, 
demand uncertainties may make animal healthcare 
providers or managers reluctant to invest in techniques that 
involve high overhead costs. 
In addition, the benefits obtained from a method of health 
control may vary with the composition of the costs. For 
example, the adoption of more expensive capital equipment 
or consulting with highly qualified veterinarians increases 
fixed costs but the diagnosis and treatment of the disease may 
be more reliable. Consequently, in relation to maintaining 
or improving animal health, the cost-minimisation rule 
should not be applied blindly.
In applying the simple economic modelling of cost 
minimisation to the wider economics of animal health, it 
can be difficult to obtain a single, precise health-production 
indicator. Moreover, health consequences can be more 
Fig. 2 
An illustration of cost minimisation, achieved by switching 
from a method involving low overhead costs to one with higher 
overhead costs as the scale of veterinary activity increases
Each cost curve should be based on a cost-efficient expansion path
$
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by a health outcome indicator
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Coping strategies
There are several ways to cope with high overhead or 
fixed costs when managing animal health. Let us, initially, 
consider the supply of veterinary services by the private 
sector.
Most private veterinary practices supply general services, 
so the market concentration is low in this segment of the 
veterinary industry (15), whereas only a few practices 
provide specialised services. Usually, veterinary clinics 
supplying specialised services have higher overhead 
costs than general suppliers, and may rely on referrals by 
general practitioners for much of their custom. The higher 
overhead costs of specialists often consist of outlays on 
more expensive equipment and higher levels of investment 
in human capital than in the case of general practitioners. 
Nevertheless, overhead costs are important for all suppliers 
of veterinary services and, on average in Australia, account 
for at least 18% of costs (2).
This type of specialisation within an industry increases 
economic efficiency. Its specific economics depend upon 
the size of the market (more generally, on the level of 
market demand), as first observed by Alfred Marshall (1). 
multi-product in nature than single-product. This requires 
more sophisticated analysis than usual.
Effects of high fixed costs on 
industrial structure and methods 
for efficiently coping with these
Structural aspects
High overhead costs often preclude businesses from entering 
a market and consequently the supply of a product may 
be dominated by only a few enterprises. Pharmaceutical 
veterinary businesses face high overhead costs to pay for 
the research and development of new products, as well 
as high costs for producing these goods, for registering 
and marketing new products and for protecting their 
investments in intellectual property. Persistent market 
dominance by a few enterprises compounds this exclusion 
of new entrants (10).
This dominance in the global supply of animal health 
products is evident in Table I, where the top ten producers 
of animal health products are presented by their worldwide 
sales revenue in 2013. These firms differ considerably in 
size. For example, the sales revenue of Zoetis was more 
than tenfold that of Vétoquinol S.A. in 2013. Most of these 
companies are associated with, or have been spun off from, 
even larger companies involved in the production of human 
health products. Each company has tended to develop its 
own area of specialisation in different product areas (relying 
partly on patents). Consequently, market competition is 
limited and some form of monopoly power is evident in 
their respective market niches. One observable vector of 
specialisation is the various health requirements of different 
species, e.g. cattle, pigs, poultry, dogs and cats (see reports 
on the top animal health companies in 11).
Opinions are divided about the economic benefits and 
drawbacks of market concentration (12, 13, 14). The 
economic performance of particular industries needs to be 
assessed individually, not just on their structural attributes. 
The size of the market influences the economics of the 
private sector developing and supplying pharmaceutical 
veterinary products. When overhead costs are high, the size 
of the market must be large enough, or the willingness to 
pay for the product must be high enough, to enable these 
costs to be recouped. Consequently, private enterprises are 
likely to favour the development and supply of products 
which are needed in higher-income countries in preference 
to those wanted in lower-income countries with a lesser 
ability to pay. 
Table I
Top ten animal health companies worldwide in 2013, based on 
their revenue in US$ billions and their shares in their aggregate 
revenue
Source : based on FiercePharma (11)
Company
Revenue 
US$ billion
Percentage
Cumulative 
percentage
1. Zoetis 4.56 22.87 22.87
2. Merck Animal 
Health
3.36 16.85 39.72
3. Merial 2.73 13.69 53.41
4. Elanco 2.15 10.78 64.19
5. Bayer Animal 
Health
1.80 9.30 73.22
6. Boehringer 
Ingelheim 
Vetmedica
1.80 9.30 82.85
7. Novartis Animal 
Health
1.17 5.87 88.11
8. Virbac S.A. 1.00 5.02 93.13
9. Ceva Sante 
Animale
0.96 4.81 97.94
10. Vétoquinol S.A. 0.41 2.06 100.00
Total 19.94 100.00 (a)
 
a) Does not add up to 100, due to rounding
US$: United States dollars 
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The larger the size of the market, the greater the scope for 
beneficial economic specialisation.
However, they also depend on market-transaction costs. 
The lower these costs are, the more economic it is to focus 
on providing specialist veterinary services. In modern times, 
reductions in the real cost of transport and the increased 
use of advanced information technology have accelerated 
the trend towards specialisation. Furthermore, increases 
in the amount of veterinary knowledge and associated 
technologies have contributed to this process. In addition 
to this, lower market-transaction costs increase the size of 
the market. 
Livestock farmers (especially smallholders) may cooperate 
to reduce their individual overhead costs of gaining 
access to veterinary services. However, organising such 
cooperation does not come free and the main burden of 
organising usually falls on those initiating the process. 
This creates a barrier to creating cooperative arrangements 
for maintaining or improving animal health, even when 
such arrangements would collectively increase economic 
efficiency and the benefits from investing in area-wide 
animal health management. These transaction costs also 
facilitate market failure. 
Consequently, the best possible solution to preventing 
neglected diseases from becoming communal problems and 
dealing with transaction costs may be for government action 
to fill such gaps in the market failure of the animal health 
system. This can involve different layers of government, 
as well as international cooperation by governments in 
setting up and maintaining relevant international bodies, 
for example, the World Organisation for Animal Health 
(OIE). As a result of government intervention, it may be 
possible to cover the necessary fixed costs associated with 
the economic operation of national and international health 
systems, thereby ensuring that economic animal health 
initiatives are undertaken which would not be met by the 
private commercial sector or by individual cooperative 
arrangements between animal owners.
Veterinary education is another component of animal health 
systems which can involve high overhead costs, particularly 
advanced education, which is often associated with research 
tilted in favour of basic research. Such research may be of 
considerable collective economic value but is unlikely to 
be undertaken by the private sector because intellectual 
property rights cannot be safeguarded and the outcomes 
can be very uncertain (16). Making the results of this type 
of research freely and widely available is usually beneficial 
from a collective economic point of view.
In national terms, because of the high level of overhead 
costs, it is only economic to have a limited number of 
higher education and research bodies engaged in training 
veterinarians and in veterinary research. Furthermore, 
some less-developed countries do not find it economic to 
provide these services and must rely on institutions in more 
developed countries to supply them. However, the extent 
to which the requirements of the former are met by the 
latter can vary. For example, some veterinary educational 
institutions in higher-income countries may primarily focus 
on animal health issues in those countries (e.g. companion 
animals) and give correspondingly less attention to the 
animal health priorities of less-developed countries, such as 
their endemic livestock diseases.
Conclusion
While all costs incurred in maintaining and improving 
animal health are important, fixed or overhead costs are 
particularly important for several reasons. First, they have 
a major influence on the thresholds at which animal health 
interventions become economic. Secondly, they have 
significant implications for the evolution of the structures 
of animal health systems, which may or may not be optimal 
from a collective economic point of view. Thirdly, they 
motivate health managers to search for economic ways to 
cope with their presence. This article has provided insights 
into each of these aspects.
Furthermore, this article has clearly shown that the concept 
of fixed costs is more complex than it seems to be at first 
sight, especially when the dynamics and consequences 
of managerial decision-making about animal health are 
considered. In addition, several economic aspects of trade-
offs between fixed and variable costs have been discussed. 
This issue usually involves economic decisions about how 
much expenditure should be committed to obtain capital 
items, as compared to non-capital ones.
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L’importance des coûts fixes dans les systèmes de santé animale
Importancia de los costos fijos en los sistemas de sanidad animal
C.A. Tisdell & D. Adamson
Résumé
Les auteurs de cet article décrivent en détail la structure et la gestion optimale des 
systèmes de santé, telles que les influencent l’existence et le volume des coûts 
fixes. Contrairement aux coûts variables, les coûts fixes ne sont pas modulables 
et sont donc indépendants du volume d’activité du secteur vétérinaire à court 
terme. Leur importance est illustrée par l’utilisation simultanée de modèles 
couvrant une période unique et de modèles multi-périodiques. Il est démontré 
qu’en santé animale, le processus décisionnel par étapes peut souvent être 
envisagé comme une séquence de problèmes liés aux coûts fixes. En général, 
il apparaît clairement que plus les coûts fixes sont élevés, plus grand doit être 
le bénéfice net dégagé par les prestations vétérinaires, si l’on veut que celles-ci 
soient rentables.  Les auteurs évaluent également l’intérêt éventuel de réduire les 
coûts fixes en essayant de compenser cette baisse par une augmentation des 
coûts variables. 
Les coûts fixes ont des répercussions structurelles majeures sur l’activité du 
secteur des produits de santé animale ainsi que sur les prestations vétérinaires 
du secteur privé. Dans le secteur des produits de santé animale, les coûts fixes 
favorisent la concentration des marchés et la spécialisation de l’offre. Dans le 
secteur de l’exercice vétérinaire privé, ils incitent à une spécialisation accrue. Si 
la coopération individuelle des éleveurs peut contribuer à réduire leurs charges 
fixes à l’échelle individuelle, les contraintes organisationnelles et les coûts 
induits par une telle coopération peuvent s’avérer redoutables. Dans de telles 
configurations, la seule solution consiste à confier la prestation des services 
vétérinaires au secteur public. Il peut aussi être fait appel à la coopération 
internationale. Les coûts fixes influencent également la nature de l’offre de 
formation en médecine vétérinaire. 
Mots-clés
Coopération internationale – Coûts fixes – Coûts variables – Enseignement de la médecine 
vétérinaire – Frais généraux – Processus décisionnel en économie – Structure sectorielle 
– Systèmes de santé animale.
C.A. Tisdell & D. Adamson
Resumen
Los autores exponen en detalle la estructura y la gestión óptima de los sistemas 
sanitarios en aquellos aspectos que se ven influidos por la presencia de costos 
fijos y por su cuantía. A diferencia de los costos variables, los fijos no pueden 
ser modificados y por lo tanto son, a corto plazo, independientes del nivel de 
actividad veterinaria. El uso de modelos relativos a un periodo único y a periodos 
múltiples pone de manifiesto la importancia que revisten los costos fijos. Los 
autores explican que el proceso de adopción de decisiones veterinarias, que 
discurre en varias etapas, puede ser entendido a menudo como una secuencia 
de problemas ligados a los costos fijos. En general queda claro que, cuanto más 
elevados sean los costos fijos de la actividad veterinaria, mayor beneficio neto 
debe deparar esta para ser rentable. Los autores también valoran en qué medida 
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resulta rentable disminuir los costos fijos y tratar de compensar esta reducción 
con un aumento de los costos variables. 
Los costos fijos influyen sobremanera en la estructura de actividad económica 
del sector de los productos de sanidad animal y en la estructura de la prestación 
privada de servicios veterinarios. En el primer caso, favorecen la concentración 
del mercado y la especialización en el suministro de determinados productos. En 
el segundo, potencian un mayor grado de especialización. Aunque la cooperación 
entre los ganaderos puede ayudar a reducir sus costos fijos individuales, este 
tipo de cooperación entraña enormes dificultades y costos organizativos. En 
tales casos, la única solución reside en la prestación de servicios veterinarios 
desde instancias oficiales. Por otro lado, también cabe recurrir a la cooperación 
internacional. Los costos fijos influyen asimismo en el tipo de enseñanza de la 
veterinaria que se imparte. 
Palabras clave
Adopción de decisiones económicas – Cooperación internacional – Costos fijos – Costos 
generales – Costos variables – Enseñanza de la veterinaria – Estructura industrial – 
Sistemas de sanidad animal.
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